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FIRST AMENDMENT LAW—FREE SPEECH AND 
HIGHER EDUCATION: CAN PUBLIC COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES USE “SAFE SPACE” POLICIES TO RESTRICT 
SPEECH ON CAMPUSES? 
John L. Magistro, IV* 
The freedom to speak openly, without fear of reprisal, is one of the 
great defining characteristics of our country.  Nowhere is this freedom 
more crucial than the arena of higher education.  Whether seeking a 
degree in the arts or sciences, philosophy or physics, students who 
venture off to college share one thing in common—their thirst for 
knowledge.  However, this pursuit of knowledge can, and does, cause 
students to confront unfamiliar, uncomfortable, and sometimes 
unpleasant material.  In college classrooms, cafeterias, and quads 
across the country, students have begun seeking shelter from thoughts 
and ideas that might make them uncomfortable.  Lately, these shelters 
have been taking the form of “safe spaces”—areas where students can 
come together and be protected from hearing viewpoints or opinions 
that might upset them.  However, when “safe spaces” limit what can 
be spoken or expressed in a public arena, they have the potential to 
infringe upon students’ First Amendment right of free speech.  This 
Note argues that using “safe spaces” to limit, restrict, or punish what 
students can say on public college and university campuses violates 
the First Amendment. 
“I want you to be offended every single day on campus.  I want you to 
be deeply aggrieved and offended and upset and then learn how to 
speak back.”1 
 
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2019.  Sincere 
thanks to all the faculty and staff who have fostered my growth as a student and future 
practitioner.  I would also like to express my appreciation for the friends and family who have 
supported me throughout this entire experience–I could not have done this without you. 
1. Flemming Rose, Safe Spaces on College Campuses Are Creating Intolerant Students, 
HUFFPOST (Mar. 30, 2017, 9:54 AM) (quoting Van Jones, former advisor to former President 
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Anthony Kapel "Van" Jones 
INTRODUCTION 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”2  
This language inarguably represents the founders’ belief that having free 
and open discourse is critical in allowing our democracy to function.3  
Indeed, “[t]he protection given speech . . . was fashioned to assure 
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.”4  Significantly, “[t]he college 
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of 
ideas,’”5 and therefore prone to the clash of perspectives that accompanies 
any discussion of opposing viewpoints.6  If speech is protected to allow 
open, candid discourse—and college campuses are inherently the arenas 
of such discourse—the logical conclusion would be that restricting speech 
on public college and university campuses is not only unconstitutional, 
but also detrimental to the prosperity and advancement of society as a 
whole.7 
And yet, students at public colleges and universities around the 
country have been voicing criticisms about their institutions, claiming 
“their schools should keep them from being ‘bombarded’ by discomfiting 
or distressing viewpoints.”8  In fact, a very real trend is emerging among 
 
Barack Obama), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/safe-spaces-college-intolerant_us_
58d957a6e4b02a2eaab66ccf [https://perma.cc/79N3-RD9Y] (“Ideological and other kinds of 
diversity are important on college campuses and in a liberal democracy because they cultivate 
tolerance . . . .”). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
3. Thomas I. Emerson, Colonial Intentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 
125 U. PA. L. REV. 737, 740 (1977) (footnote omitted).  “The guarantee of the first amendment 
was clearly intended to reach the extent described by Blackstone, namely as a prohibition of any 
system of control over the process of printing, any advance censorship of publication, and the 
like.”  Id. at 737. 
4. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
5. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
6. Natasha Josefowitz, Contentious Opposing Views: How to Co-Exist Peacefully in 
Tough Times, HUFFPOST (Feb. 27, 2017, 7:42 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/
contentious-opposing-views-how-to-co-exist-peacefully_us_58b4c715e4b02f3f81e44ba1 
[https://perma.cc/9UQH-JC5Z] (“I have caught myself trying to persuade a friend about the 
obvious wrongness of her ideas, and much to my dismay, instead of an intelligent discussion, it 
turned into a disagreeable exchange of not exactly name-calling, but dismissing the other as 
incomprehensibly and irremediably off.”). 
7. See Rose, supra note 1 (“Ideological and other kinds of diversity are important on 
college campuses and in a liberal democracy because they cultivate tolerance . . . .”). 
8. Judith Shulevitz, In College and Hiding from Scary Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-hiding-from-scary-
 
2019] FREE SPEECH AND HIGHER EDUCATION 373 
college students: they are developing a perception that they “need to be 
safe ideologically, [they] need to be safe emotionally, [and they] just need 
to feel good all the time.”9  Thus began the push for public colleges and 
universities to create “safe spaces” where students can retreat from 
thoughts, topics, and ideas that make them uncomfortable. 
But what is a “safe space?”  Where do they come from, what do they 
look like, and why have they become so popular?  As a concept, “safe 
space” originated either in the 1960s and 1970s when feminism and 
female empowerment began to gain a strong following across the country, 
or during the 1990s when gay and lesbian equality was brought to the 
forefront of social consciousness.10  In this context, “safe spaces [were] 
innocuous gatherings of like-minded people who agree[d] to refrain from 
ridicule[ ] [or] criticism . . . so that everyone [could] relax enough to 
explore the nuances of [sensitive subjects].”11 
Others consider “safe spaces” to be “place[s] (as on a college campus) 
intended to be free of bias, conflict, criticism, or potentially threatening 
actions, ideas, or conversations.”12  Specifically, “[s]afety in this sense 
does not refer to physical safety.  Instead, [college] safe space refers to 
protection from psychological or emotional harm.”13  One such “safe 
space,” established as a refuge for students during a presentation by a 
sexual assault survivor, was “equipped with cookies, coloring books, 
bubbles, Play-Doh, calming music, pillows, blankets and a video of 
frolicking puppies.”14  Undoubtedly, this “safe space” was established to 
“help vulnerable students . . . and protect[] their health and safety from 
any mental tolls,”15 while also allowing students to “take control over the 
information they decide to receive and how to receive it.”16 
 
ideas.html; see also KNIGHT FOUNDATION, FREE EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS: WHAT COLLEGE 
STUDENTS THINK ABOUT FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES 12–13 (2018), https://kf-site-
production.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/pdfs/000/000/248/original/Knight_Foundation_Fr
ee_Expression_on_Campus_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YB4-GL4X]. 
9. Rose, supra note 1. 
10. Shulevitz, supra note 8. 
11. Id. 
12. Safe Space, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
safe%20space [https://perma.cc/ZV28-XEG4] [hereinafter Safe Space]. 
13. Lynn C. Holley & Sue Steiner, Safe Space: Student Perspectives on Classroom 
Environment, 41 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 49, 50 (2005). 
14. Shulevitz, supra note 8. 
15. Fuad Rafidi, Safe Spaces and First Amendment Rights: Do Safe Spaces Belong on 
College Campuses?, JURIST (Dec. 1, 2016, 9:26 AM), http://www.jurist.org/dateline/2016/
12/Fuad-Rafidi-safe-college.php [https://perma.cc/G8UQ-SSZ8]. 
16. RaeAnn Pickett, Trigger Warnings and Safe Spaces Are Necessary, TIME (Aug. 31, 
2016), http://time.com/4471806/trigger-warnings-safe-spaces/ [https://perma.cc/DNY4-
YJEU]. 
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Therefore, safe spaces, as outlined above, serve the purpose of 
filtering various thoughts, ideas, opinions, and experiences—effectively 
restricting exposure to anything a student may find subjectively 
uncomfortable, unpleasant, or even offensive.  While this may seem like 
a worthy, laudable goal for the nation’s public colleges and universities, 
this Note argues that the protections afforded by safe spaces are not only 
detrimental to students, but are unconstitutional restrictions of free 
speech.17  Surely, as public colleges and universities attempt to keep 
students safe from uncomfortable issues and viewpoints, “[students will] 
be unprepared for the social and intellectual headwinds that will hit them” 
after graduation.18  Furthermore, filtering the information available to 
students, however well-intentioned, runs afoul of the very purpose of the 
First Amendment.19 
This Note argues that safe space policies are unconstitutional 
restrictions of free speech under the First Amendment and should not be 
implemented on public college and university campuses.  Part I explores 
the history of First Amendment litigation relating specifically to free 
speech and focusing on the relationship between free speech jurisprudence 
and the academic environment.  Part II examines past and current attempts 
at regulating speech at public colleges and universities.  Finally, Part III 
compares safe spaces to their regulatory predecessors and explains why 
they are both unconstitutional restrictions of free speech and harmful to 
students in a broader context. 
I. A HISTORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT LITIGATION 
For over one hundred years after the ratification of the Constitution, 
free speech and the First Amendment went unchallenged.20  Then, in 1919, 
free speech faced its first true hurdle in the Supreme Court.21  Thereafter, 
courts were tasked with determining whether different kinds of speech 
 
17. See Rose, supra note 1; cf. Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Trouble with Teaching Rape Law, 
NEW YORKER (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trouble-teaching-
rape-law [https://perma.cc/7VK8-L7M8]. 
18. Shulevitz, supra note 8. 
19. See David L. Hudson Jr. & Lata Nott, Hate Speech & Campus Speech Codes, 
FREEDOM F. INST. (Mar. 2017), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/hate-speech-campus-
speech-codes/ [https://perma.cc/RP2S-MQ5X] (“[T]he suppression of speech, even where the 
speech’s content appears to have little value and great costs, amounts to governmental thought 
control.” (quoting UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1174 n.9 (E.D. Wis. 
1991))). 
20. See Emerson, supra note 3, at 739. 
21. See generally Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–51 (1919) (providing 
defendants’ argument that free speech protections granted by the First Amendment allowed 
them to promote and encourage draft-dodging). 
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were truly protected under the First Amendment, whether the government 
can regulate such speech, and to what extent it may be regulated.22  Due 
to the importance of these answered questions, Part I of this Note will 
focus on cases that have examined a governmental attempt to regulate 
protected speech, establish a new category of unprotected speech, or 
clarify an otherwise murky precedent.  This Note will also remain focused 
on issues of free speech and speech restriction that are relevant to the 
discourse expected on public college and university campuses. 
A. Milestones in the Evolution of Protected Speech 
On several occasions, the Supreme Court was tasked with deciding 
whether the government can place restrictions upon the freedom of speech 
enjoyed by everyone in the country.23  Those instances will be used as a 
point of comparison for the type of speech that safe space policies attempt 
to curtail.  Therefore, it is important to understand the history of free 
speech litigation to better evaluate the current climate of potential speech 
regulations. 
1. 1919: Schenck v. United States 
The Supreme Court presided over the case involving a man who was 
allegedly responsible for obstructing the enlistment process of the United 
States military.24  The issue before the Court was whether fliers printed 
and distributed by Schenck were protected speech under the First 
Amendment despite legislation that made encouragement of 
insubordination illegal.25  Although normally Schenck would have been 
within his rights to distribute the fliers,26 the Court took issue with the 
 
22. See infra Sections I.A–I.B. 
23. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (holding that speech 
arguing a political opinion will be afforded First Amendment protection, even when that speech 
is offensive); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that speech “having even 
the slightest redeeming social importance” is protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (listing certain “classes” of unprotected 
speech, such as “fighting words”); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (questioning whether the nature and 
circumstances of speech “create[s] a clear and present danger”); see also Porter v. Ascension 
Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that “true threats” are unprotected 
speech). 
24. See generally Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–50, 51 (alleging defendants violated the 
Espionage Act by producing and distributing pamphlets instructing men to resist the draft by 
“assert[ing] your opposition to the draft”). 
25. Id. at 48–49. 
26. Id. at 52 (“We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying 
all that was said in the [flier] would have been within their constitutional rights.”). 
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unique situation that existed at the time, noting that “the character of every 
act depend[s] on the circumstances in which it is done.”27 
In fact, at the outset of the opinion, the Court was very careful to 
acknowledge that the allegations against Schenck arose while the United 
States was at war with the Axis Powers, indicating that encouraging 
insubordination during an active war effort rose above the traditional 
expression of free speech.28  In fact, the Court later opined, “[w]hen a 
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such 
a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight.”29 
The Court also noted that “[t]he most stringent protection of free 
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and 
causing a panic.”30  This indicates that circumstances significantly inferior 
to war could still rise to a level where speech is no longer protected.31  To 
underscore this point, the Court held that “[t]he question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a 
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
[such evils].”32 
In establishing the “clear and present danger” standard, the Court 
proclaimed for the first time that the First Amendment did not protect all 
speech.33  In fact, not only did the Court determine that some speech may 
never be protected, the Court also held that speech that might otherwise 
be protected by the First Amendment could lose some or all of those 
protections depending on the circumstances under which the speech 
occurred.34  This standard, also known as the “circumstances and nature” 
test, is one the Court has continued to use when determining issues of 
protected speech.35 
 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 49, 52. 
29. Id. at 52. 
30. Id. 
31. See id. (“[Free speech protection] does not even protect a man from an injunction 
against uttering words that may have all the effect of force.”). 
32. Id. 
33. Id.  A query of LexisNexis and Westlaw returned no Supreme Court cases that 
addressed the government’s ability to regulate or punish speech in any regard prior to deciding 
Schenck. 
34. See id. at 52 (holding that restrictions may be placed on speech during times of war). 
35. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (emphasis added) (“In 
considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate 
all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and how it was 
said.”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[I]t is well understood that 
the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”); Herndon v. 
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2. 1942: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 
Twenty-three years after Schenck, the Court took the seemingly 
narrow exceptions of unprotected speech outlined above and broadly 
expanded them.36  In Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness exclaimed that 
someone on a public street was a “damned racketeer” and a “damned 
Fascist.”37  The Court determined that “well-defined and narrowly limited 
classes of speech” could be prohibited without violating the First 
Amendment.38  These classes of speech included lewd, obscene, profane, 
libelous, and insulting language, as well as “fighting words.”39  
Specifically, “fighting words” are “those which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”40 
3. 1957: Roth v. United States 
In 1957, the Court chose to address the constitutionality of federal 
and state obscenity statutes, in particular, as they pertain to the 
aforementioned classes of lewd and obscene speech.41  The Roth case 
actually joined two causes of action: Roth, who was convicted of violating 
federal law by distributing obscene material via mail, 42 and Alberts, who 
was convicted of violating a California statue, which prohibited the 
creation, distribution, or advertisement of obscene material.43 
The Court analyzed the underlying purpose of having protected 
speech, stating “[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social 
importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to 
the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of [the First 
Amendment].”44  The Court then restated its language about “narrowly 
limited classes” of speech—citing lewd and obscene speech specifically—
and opining that “such utterances are no essential part of any exposition 
 
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 256 (1937) (“We recognized, however, that words may be spoken or 
written for various purposes and that wilful [sic] and intentional interference with the described 
operations of the government might be inferred from the time, place, and circumstances of the 
act.”); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (emphasis added) (“If [obstruction] was 
intended and if, in all the circumstances, [obstruction] would be its probable effect, [the speech] 
would not be protected by reason of its being part of a general program and expressions of a 
general and conscientious belief.”). 
36. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
37. Id. at 569. 
38. Id. at 571–72. 
39. Id. at 572. 
40. Id. 
41. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957). 
42. Id. at 480. 
43. Id. at 481. 
44. Id. at 484. 
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of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”45  To that end, the Court noted that the free 
speech protections of the First Amendment are primarily concerned with 
allowing and encouraging the discussion and exchange of “all matters of 
public concern.”46  Truly, “[t]he fundamental freedom[] of 
speech . . . [has] contributed greatly to the development and well-being of 
our free society.”47 
After applying this analysis to the claims of Roth and Alberts, the 
Court concluded that lewd and obscene speech falls outside the 
protections afforded by the First Amendment.48  In so doing, the Court 
solidified that these classes of speech can be restricted through 
governmental means, albeit for seemingly sincere reasons.49 
4. 1969: Watts v. United States 
Twelve years later, in 1969, another issue of free speech was 
presented to the Court: the right to engage in political discourse.50  Watts 
engaged in a political discussion during a public rally at the Washington 
Monument in Washington, D.C.51  At this rally, and in response to a 
remark about education, Watts stated “[t]hey always holler at us to get an 
education.  And now I have already received my draft classification . . . If 
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.B.J.”52  As a result, Watts was convicted of a felony for “knowingly and 
willfully threatening the President.”53 
In its analysis, the Court stated that “[t]he language of the political 
arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”54  Indeed, “debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open [sic], 
and . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials.”55  Therefore, looking 
at Watts’ statements in context, the Court concluded his speech was akin 
 
45. Id. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
46. Id. at 488 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940)). 
47. Id. 
48. See id. at 492. 
49. See id. at 488. 
50. See generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (holding that political 
discourse is afforded First Amendment protection). 
51. Id. at 706. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 708 (citation omitted). 
55. Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
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to voicing his own political opinion.56  By holding that—despite being 
crude and offensive—Watts voiced his opposition to the current political 
climate, the Court effectively ruled that speech voicing or conveying a 
political opinion is crucial enough to be afforded First Amendment 
protection, even though such speech can be particularly crass.57 
5. 1989: Ward v. Rock Against Racism 
Perhaps the largest provision for governmental regulation of speech 
came in 1989: content neutral restrictions.  Rock Against Racism (RAR) 
came before the Court to address a New York City Parks Department 
(NYCPD) auditory control policy that affected sound amplification and 
modification at the Naumburg Acoustic Bandshell (the Bandshell).58  
From 1979 to 1986, RAR put on an annual performance at the Bandshell, 
during which time “the city received numerous complaints about 
excessive sound amplification at [RAR] concerts from park users and 
residents of areas adjacent to the park” where the Bandshell was located.59  
In response to the complaints, the NYCPD developed a set of guidelines 
for those wishing to use the Bandshell.60  Ultimately, the NYCPD 
determined that the city could best ensure sound quality at the Bandshell 
without disturbing the local community by providing equipment 
appropriate for the venue, as well as personnel trained to operate such 
equipment.61 
The Court began its analysis by noting that the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals applied the correct standard in that “[c]ontent neutral time, 
place and manner regulations are permissible so long as they are narrowly 
tailored to serve a substantial government interest and do not unreasonably 
limit alternative avenues of expression.”62  The Court then clarified that 
such restrictions must be “‘justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
 
56. Id. 
57. See id. 
58. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989). 
59. Id. at 785. 
60. Id. at 785–87. 
61. Id. at 787. 
62. Id. at 789 (alteration in original) (quoting Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 
367, 370 (2d Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).  When RAR challenged 
the NYCPD measures, the trial court concluded those measures were constitutional, but the 
Second Circuit reversed the decision on appeal.  Id. at 784. 
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governmental interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication.’”63 
The crux of RAR’s argument was that the NYCPD policy could not 
be content neutral “because it [was] based upon the quality, and thus the 
content, of the speech being regulated.”64  However, the Court held that 
the “government ‘ha[s] a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from 
unwelcome noise,’”65  specifically noting that “[t]his interest is perhaps at 
its greatest when government seeks to protect ‘“the well-being, 
tranquility, and privacy of the home.”’”66  Finally, the Court concluded 
that a governmental regulation should be viewed in relation to the general 
concern the regulation seeks to address, rather than on a case-by-case 
basis.67 
6. 2004: Porter v. Ascension Parish School Board 
In 2004, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals determined whether 
speech considered to be a “true threat” is protected under the First 
Amendment.68  Adam Porter, a fourteen-year-old, drew a picture of his 
high school, East Ascension High School (EAHS), one night while he was 
at home.69  The Court described the picture as “crudely drawn, depicting 
the school under a state of siege by a gasoline tanker truck, missile 
launcher, helicopter, and various armed persons.”70  The sketch also 
included inappropriate words and phrases, some of which were directed 
at the EAHS principal.71  However, the sketch remained tucked safely 
away in the privacy of his home, until a friend, Andrew Breen, came upon 
the sketch pad and used it for his own drawing.72 
While transporting the sketchpad to school, Breen and another 
student flipped through the pages of the sketch pad and happened upon 
Porter’s drawing.73  Breen then showed the picture to his bus driver, who 
 
63. Id. at 791 (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 
(1984)). 
64. Id. at 792. 
65. Id. at 796 (alteration in original) (quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for 
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984) (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949))). 
66. Id. (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)). 
67. Id. at 801. 
68. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 618 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. 
denied, 544 U.S. 1062 (2005). 
69. Id. at 611. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
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in turn showed it to Breen’s school principal.74  After a series of inquiries, 
the principal expelled Porter from school after it was determined that he 
drew the picture.75  Both Porter and Breen filed a cause of action, claiming 
their First Amendment rights were violated.76  They argued that the 
artwork qualified as protected speech under the First Amendment and, 
therefore, punishing the students for their protected speech was an 
infringement on their right of free speech.77 
The Court began with the notion that “school officials may regulate 
student speech when they can demonstrate that such speech would 
‘substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the 
rights of other students.’”78  The court next cited another “class” of speech 
not protected by the First Amendment: true threats.79  A “true threat” is 
speech that would lead a reasonable person to believe, when viewed 
objectively, that the speech is a “serious expression of an intent to cause a 
present or future harm.”80 
The court determined that a sketch drawn in the privacy of one’s own 
home and stored for two years before being taken to a separate school by 
a third party cannot meet the threshold of being a “true threat” as described 
above.81  As a matter of fact, “to lose the protection of the First 
Amendment and be lawfully punished, the threat must be intentionally or 
knowingly communicated to either the object of the threat or a third 
person.”82  This requirement of intentional or knowing communication of 
a threat is a crucial bar against those who would take offense when faced 
with discussions of general opinions or policies—as on public college and 
university campuses. 
7. 2014: McCullen v. Coakley 
Recently, the Court evaluated the issue of protected speech as it 
pertains to “public fora.”  In 2014, the Court determined the 
constitutionality of a Massachusetts law that restricted speech in certain 
 
74. Id. at 611. 
75. Id. at 612. 
76. Id. 
77. See id. at 612–13. 
78. Id. at 615 (quoting Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 442 (5th 
Cir.1996)).  This standard will be addressed in detail in Part II, which specifically discusses free 
speech that happens on school property. 
79. Id. at 616. 
80. Id. (quoting Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
81. Id. at 617–18. 
82. Id. at 616 (first emphasis added). 
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areas around abortion clinics.83  The statute in question established a 
“buffer zone” of thirty-five feet within “any portion of an entrance, exit or 
driveway of a reproductive health care facility,” which increased the size 
of the previous eighteen-foot buffer zone.84  In essence, the statute 
prevented anyone who was not a patient, employee, first responder, or 
other person “acting within the scope of their employment” from 
approaching the entrances and driveways of a reproductive health clinic 
unless they were using the sidewalk “solely for the purpose of reaching a 
destination other than such facility.”85 
The Court began by noting that the statute “regulate[d] access to 
‘public way[s]’ and ‘sidewalk[s].’”86  These areas, the Court opined, 
“occupy a ‘special position in terms of First Amendment protection’ 
because of their historic role as sites for discussion and debate.”87  
Undeniably, “[t]hese places . . . ‘have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.’”88  Similarly, “the First Amendment’s purpose [is] ‘to preserve 
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail.’”89 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the actions of the petitioners—
“sidewalk counseling,” and, more importantly, handing out fliers—were 
akin to “handing out leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial 
viewpoint . . . [and] are the essence of First Amendment expression.”90  
These factors—coupled with the size of the “buffer zones” and the 
“special position” of sidewalks in the scheme of First Amendment 
protections—led the Court to conclude that the Massachusetts statute was 
an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.91 
As evidenced by a litany of cases, the Court carved several small 
exceptions from the body of First Amendment speech protections: the 
“circumstances and nature” test cemented in the Schenck decision;92 the 
 
83. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2525 (2014). 
84. Id. at 2526 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 120E½(b) (2018)).  “[T]he 
Massachusetts Legislature amended the statute in 2007, replacing the six-foot no-approach 
zones . . . with a 35-foot fixed buffer zone from which individuals are categorically excluded.”  
Id. 
85. Id. (quoting § 120E½(b)(1)–(4)). 
86. Id. at 2528 (first alteration added) (quoting § 120E½(b)). 
87. Id. at 2529 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983)). 
88. Id. (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009)). 
89. Id. (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)). 
90. Id. at 2536 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)). 
91. See id. at 2536–41. 
92. See supra Section I.A.1. 
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handful of unprotected “classes” of speech outlined in Chaplinsky;93 the 
distinction between speech having even the most minuscule social 
significance from that outweighed by a “social interest in order and 
morality” as described in Roth;94 the declaration that statements of 
political opposition are protected no matter how crude as determined in 
Watts;95 the critical “[c]ontent neutral time, place and manner” exception 
stated in Ward;96 the “true threat” standard defined in Porter;97 and the 
“public fora” exception outlined in McCullen.98  Together, these 
exceptions encapsulate the current distinction between protected and 
unprotected speech in the general sphere of public discourse, and it is upon 
this foundation that the Court has based its decisions regarding speech 
protections in public schools. 
B. First Amendment Protections for Students in a School Environment 
Just as historical developments have impacted the trajectory of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the issue of protected speech at public schools 
has also been directly impacted by cultural and social happenings in U.S. 
history.  For example, the late 1960s were a tumultuous time and led to an 
increase in political activism among the younger population.99  
Particularly, involvement in the Vietnam conflict drew stark lines among 
the American people, and students began protesting the hostilities.100  
 
93. See supra Section I.A.2. 
94. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
95. See supra Section I.A.4. 
96. See supra Section I.A.5. 
97. See supra Section I.A.6. 
98. See supra Section I.A.7. 
99. Kenneth T. Walsh, The 1960s: A Decade of Promise and Heartbreak, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Mar. 9, 2010, 4:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/03/09/the-
1960s-a-decade-of-promise-and-heartbreak. 
By the end of the decade, [President] Kennedy had been assassinated, along with 
his brother Robert and the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.  America’s cities had 
become Powder Kegs as African-Americans, despite historic gains toward legal 
equality, became more impatient than ever at being second-class citizens.  Women 
began demanding their rights in unprecedented numbers.  Young people and their 
parents felt a widening generation gap as seen in their differing perceptions of 
patriotism, drug use, sexuality, and the work ethic.  The now familiar culture wars 
between liberals and conservatives caused angry divisions over law and order, 
busing, racial preferences, abortion, the Vietnam War, and America’s use of 
military force abroad. 
Id. 
100. See id. (“[T]he number of college students doubled between 1940 and 1960 to 3.6 
million, creating a huge pool of high-minded if sometimes misguided activists with the 
motivation and time to devote to political and social causes.”). 
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Born of this wave of student activism was a new question regarding the 
freedom of speech afforded to students of public schools. 
1. 1969: Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District 
In 1969, a group of students attending public schools in Des Moines, 
Iowa, staged a protest against the conflict in Vietnam.101  Specifically, the 
students decided to show solidarity for an end to the Vietnam conflict by 
wearing black armbands.102  Once aware of the students’ plan to wear the 
armbands at school, the principals of several Des Moines schools 
instituted a policy, which stated “any student wearing an armband to 
school would be asked to remove it, and if he refused he would be 
suspended until he returned without the armband.”103  The petitioners in 
Tinker violated this policy and were suspended, not returning until after 
the scheduled protest period had lapsed.104 
At the outset of its discussion, the Court’s position was very clear: 
“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students.  It can 
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”105  Furthermore, 
the Court noted that it is crucial “not to strangle the free mind at its source 
and [to] teach youth to discount important principles of our government 
as mere platitudes.”106 
However, the Court did not discount the need for order and civility.107  
In fact, the Court indicated that if the issue “relate[d] to [the] regulation 
of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hair style, or deportment,” 
then the regulation of speech in this case might hold water.108  The 
regulation was not directed at any speech deemed to be aggressive, 
disruptive, or otherwise detrimental to the learning environment at the 
school.109  To the contrary, the Court made clear there was “no evidence 
whatever of [the] petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent, with the 
 
101. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 506. 
106. Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
107. See id. (“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the 
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools.”). 
108. See id. at 507–08. 
109. Id. at 508. 
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schools’ work or of collision with the rights of other students to be secure 
and to be let alone.”110 
In beginning its analysis, the Court made a powerful statement: 
[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance 
is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.  Any 
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.  Any 
variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear.  Any word 
spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates 
from the views of another person may start an argument or cause a 
disturbance.  But our Constitution says we must take this risk, and our 
history says that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of 
openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the 
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this 
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.111 
The Court found no “evidence that the school authorities had reason 
to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially 
interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other 
students.”112  As there was no evidence indicating a particular disturbance 
that the school sought to avoid, it was determined that “the action of the 
school authorities appear[ed] to have been based upon an urgent wish to 
avoid the controversy which might result from the expression . . . of 
opposition to this Nation’s part in the conflagration in Vietnam.”113  The 
Court also noted that “the school authorities did not purport to prohibit the 
wearing of all symbols of political or controversial significance.”114 
The Court succinctly reiterated the theme of their decision: “The 
prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without 
evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference 
with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.”115  
Furthermore, “[f]reedom of expression would not truly exist if the right 
could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has 
provided as a safe haven for crackpots.”116 
Tinker was the flagship case for protected speech in public schools 
and has been cited, at length, in several other First Amendment cases in 
the years since it was decided.117  Throughout those cases, the Court 
 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 508–09 (citation omitted). 
112. Id. at 509. 
113. Id. at 510. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 511. 
116. Id. at 513. 
117. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. 
Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615–16 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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repeatedly acknowledged the importance of protected speech to the 
educational process—thus, the foundation for free speech in public 
schools was laid. 
2. 1972: Healy v. James 
In 1972, the sociopolitical climate was similar to Tinker—“[a] 
climate of unrest prevailed on many college campuses in [the] country.  
There had been widespread civil disobedience on some campuses, 
accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson.”118  Only 
three years after Tinker was decided, students at Central Connecticut State 
College (CCSC) brought suit against school officials for failing to 
recognize their student organization.119  The petitioners in this case sought 
to establish a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), an 
organization present on campuses across the country—one which had 
been deemed “a catalytic force during this period.”120 
Petitioners complied with CCSC procedures for getting their 
organization officially recognized by the school, including filing an 
official request with the Student Affairs Committee (SAC).121  The official 
request listed three specific reasons for the creation and existence of the 
new SDS chapter: 
It would provide “a forum of discussion and self-education for 
students developing an analysis of American society”; it would serve 
as “an agency for integrating thought with action so as to bring about 
constructive changes”; and it would endeavor to provide “a 
coordinating body for relating the problems of leftist students” with 
other interested groups on campus and in the community.122 
Despite agreeing that the statement of SDS was “clear and 
unobjectionable on its face,”123 the SAC made further inquiries into the 
organization’s motives and associations.  As a result, the SAC requested 
additional filing by SDS regarding affiliations with any national 
organization.124  Ultimately, although SAC did recommend SDS for 
official recognition, the President of CCSC denied their recommendation, 
because “[h]e found that the organization’s philosophy was antithetical to 
 
118. Healy, 408 U.S. at 171. 
119. Id. at 172–77. 
120. Id. at 171. 
121. Id. at 172. 
122. Id. (quoting Healy v. James, 445 F.2d 1122, 1132–39 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 172–73. 
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the school’s policies, and that the group’s independence [from other SDS 
chapters] was doubtful.”125 
The Court began by reiterating not only its position that public 
schools are subject to the First Amendment as it pertains to free speech, 
but also that the need for order does not mean that protections afforded by 
the First Amendment should be substantially weakened on college 
campuses.126  “Quite to the contrary, ‘[t]he vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of 
American schools.’”127  The Court also noted the importance of shielding 
First Amendment protections from both direct attack and “more subtle 
governmental interference.”128 
The Court concluded that failing to officially recognize SDS as a 
student organization impacted the students’ “ability to participate in the 
intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated 
purpose,” and that “[s]uch impediments cannot be viewed as 
insubstantial.”129  The Court also noted that “‘guilt by association alone, 
without [establishing] that an individual’s association poses the threat 
feared by the Government,’ is an impermissible basis upon which to deny 
First Amendment rights.”130  Ultimately, it was the Court’s position that 
the students seeking to establish a chapter of the SDS could not have their 
First Amendment rights limited in this way, and that “[a]s repugnant as 
these views may have been, especially to one with [the President’s] 
responsibility, the mere expression of [those views] would not justify the 
denial of First Amendment rights.”131 
In addition to applying First Amendment protections to speech at 
public colleges and universities, the Court in its holding also declared that 
merely expressing an opinion, even a “repugnant” one, is not grounds for 
punishment.132  In other words, the exchange of ideas and opinions at 
public colleges and universities should not be subject to arbitrary 
censorship or punishment. 
 
125. Id. at 174–75 (footnote omitted). 
126. See id. at 180. 
127. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). 
128. Id. at 183 (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960)). 
129. Id. at 181–82. 
130. Id. at 186 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 
(1967)). 
131. Id. at 187. 
132. Id. at 187–88. 
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3. 2001: Bonnell v. Lorenzo 
In 2001, nearly thirty years after Healy, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals was tasked with addressing the ability to restrict speech on 
college campuses.133  Bonnell was an English teacher at Macomb 
Community College (MCC), a position he had held since 1967.134  
Between February 1998 and September 1999, several students filed 
complaints against Bonnell alleging that he had used inappropriate, 
distasteful language.135  Each of these accusations resulted in verbal 
warnings and in-person meetings conducted by his superiors at MCC, as 
well as written memoranda.136  The first warning stated: 
Unless germane to discussion of appropriate course materials and 
thus a constitutionally protected act of academic freedom, your 
utterance in the classroom of such words as ‘fuck,’ ‘cunt[,]’ and 
‘pussy’ may serve as a reasonable basis for concluding as a matter of 
law that you are fostering a learning environment hostile to women, a 
form of sexual harassment.137 
Bonnell was initially placed on suspension; however, the district 
court granted a preliminary injunction and his position was reinstated.138  
Upon returning to class, another student filed a complaint against 
petitioner, leading Bonnell to bring this action.139 
The court began by outlining the existing sociopolitical atmosphere 
at the time. 
Currently, a debate rages concerning the degree to which speech 
that is sexually or racially harassing is protected.  And nowhere is that 
debate more heated than on university campuses, historically 
committed to unrestricted inquiry and exploring of ideas, yet morally 
obligated to promoting respect . . . .140 
The court also noted that any actions taken by the government to limit 
or restrict speech must be based on something other than the wish to 
 
133. See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 802 (6th Cir. 2001). 
134. Id. at 802–03. 
135. Id. at 803–05.  In fact, one accusation alleged that Bonnell “displayed a lack of 
maturity, sensitivity, and responsibility, by taking advantage of the conversations to express his 
own previous sexual experiences.”  Id. at 804. 
136. Id. at 803–06. 
137. Id. at 803. 
138. Id. at 808. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 810 (quoting Beverly Earle & Anita Cava, The Collision of Rights and a Search 
for Limits: Free Speech in the Academy and Freedom from Sexual Harassment on Campus, 18 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 283 (1997)). 
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“avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint.”141  However, it is important to consider the nature 
of the speech at issue as well: 
“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public 
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a 
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”  Speech which can 
be “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community” touches upon matters of public 
concern.142 
In evaluating Bonnell’s speech, the court echoed its “circumstances 
and nature” analysis from Schenck by noting that context is an important 
issue when judging whether speech falls under the First Amendment.143  
Furthermore, 
the protection afforded to offensive messages does not always 
embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling 
audience cannot avoid it.  Indeed, it may not be the content of the 
speech, as much as the deliberate verbal or visual assault, that justifies 
proscription.  Even in a public forum, one of the reasons we tolerate a 
protester’s right to wear a jacket expressing his opposition to 
government policy in vulgar language is because offended viewers can 
effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by 
averting their eyes.144 
Applying these considerations to the facts of Bonnell, where the 
petitioner was a professor and the audience is his students, it is clear that 
a unique relationship exists “such that [the] students are a ‘captive 
audience’ who may find themselves intimidated by the person who has 
the ability to pass upon them a poor grade.”145  In fact, if a teacher’s 
language “‘taken in context . . . constitute[s] a deliberate, superfluous 
attack on a “captive audience” with no academic purpose or 
justification,’” that language will not be protected.146 
As Bonnell makes clear, it is not impossible to restrict speech on 
college or university campuses.147  Truly, 
 
141. See id. at 811 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
509 (1969)). 
142. Id. at 812 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48, 146 (1983)). 
143. See id. at 819; see also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding 
that the “circumstances and nature” of speech can determine whether it is protected under the 
First Amendment). 
144. Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 819 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000)). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. (citing Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
147. Id. at 826–27. 
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just as we “hope that whenever we decide to tolerate intolerant speech, 
the speaker as well as the audience will understand that we do so to 
express our deep commitment to the value of tolerance—a value 
protected by every clause in the single sentence called the First 
Amendment[,]” we also hope that whenever we decide that intolerant 
speech should be restricted, it is understood that we do so with no less 
commitment to the value of tolerance and the First Amendment in 
which it is enshrined.148 
Just as the Court defined the parameters of First Amendment speech 
protections in the general public sphere, complete with several tests and 
classifications,149 the Court also evaluated whether those parameters 
applied in public classrooms across the country.150  Whether by 
determining that an “undifferentiated fear” is not enough to stifle speech 
in a public high school where a free exchange of ideas is crucial to the 
development of young minds,151 by extending that same protection to 
public colleges and universities by solidifying the need for constitutional 
freedoms in American public schools,152 or by distinguishing 
uncomfortable academic speech from “‘a deliberate, superfluous attack on 
a “captive audience,”’”153 the courts made clear that the First Amendment 
applies to speech in all public arenas, not just a street corner or city hall.  
It is against this backdrop that we turn to addressing safe space policies as 
the most recent affront to free speech on public college and university 
campuses. 
II. HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS TO RESTRICT SPEECH IN THE ACADEMIC 
SETTING: SAFE SPACE PREDECESSORS 
As outlined above, the courts have largely been hesitant to uphold 
restrictions on free speech, whether on a public street or on a college 
campus.154  That has not stopped many schools from trying to implement 
various methods of restricting speech.  One such method can be seen in 
speech codes.155  Though the general purpose of speech codes is “to 
prevent a rise in discriminatory harassment,” the courts have been equally 
 
148. Id. at 827 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
149. See supra Sections I.A.1–7. 
150. See supra Sections I.B.1–3. 
151. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
152. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). 
153. Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 819 (quoting Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 
1986)). 
154. See supra Part I. 
155. See Hudson & Nott, supra note 19. 
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hesitant to allow these restrictions of speech as well.156  Therefore, to 
better understand how safe space policies are in violation of the First 
Amendment, it is important to examine the few exceptions where the 
courts have ultimately allowed limited restrictions of free speech on public 
college and university campuses. 
A. Speech Codes: Overbroad, Vague, and Unconstitutional 
A perfect example of an unconstitutional speech restriction on college 
campuses occurred in the late 1980s.  In 1989, several incidents occurred 
at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor that prompted school officials 
to reconsider their anti-harassment policy.157  Such incidents included the 
circulation of fliers containing derogatory language referring to black 
students and the broadcast of racist jokes by the campus radio.158  These 
incidents, followed by several hearings and revisions of the original 
speech code, ultimately led to the implementation of the school’s “policy 
on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment,” which sought to 
regulate speech in certain locations on campus as well as targeted speech 
and actions.159 
The policy itself was designed to apply “specifically to ‘[e]ducational 
and academic centers, such as classroom buildings, libraries, research 
laboratories, recreation and study centers.’”160  The policies targeted 
[a]ny behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an 
individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual 
orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, 
handicap[,] or Vietnam-era veteran status, . . . [including s]exual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical conduct 
that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of sex or 
sexual orientation . . . .161 
Anyone found to be in violation of the new policy could be subject to 
sanctions including: “(1) formal reprimand; (2) community service; (3) 
class attendance; (4) restitution; (5) removal from University housing; (6) 
suspension from specific courses and activities; (7) suspension; [or] (8) 
expulsion.”162 
 
156. Id. 
157. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853–55 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
158. Id. at 854. 
159. Id. at 856–58. 
160. Id. at 856. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 857. 
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The court began its analysis by distinguishing protected speech from 
“mere conduct.”163  Indeed, there are many state and federal prohibitions 
on discrimination that are not in conflict with the First Amendment; the 
same is true for abusive or harassing conduct.164  The court also reiterated 
the “fighting words” doctrine developed in Chaplinsky, and indicated that 
colleges and universities could regulate such speech so long as the 
prohibition was not implemented “because [the university] disagreed with 
[the] ideas or messages sought to be conveyed.”165  The court also noted 
that “[a] law regulating speech will be deemed overbroad if it sweeps 
within its ambit a substantial amount of protected speech along with that 
which it may legitimately regulate.”166 
Using this framework, the court considered each of the following 
incidents in turn: a student who commented on “the origins or ‘curability’ 
of homosexuality in the School of Social Work;”167 a business student who 
read “an allegedly homophobic limerick” while participating in an in-class 
exercise;168 and a student who merely commented that “he had heard that 
minorities had a difficult time in the course and that he had heard that they 
were not treated fairly.”169  The district court noted that in handling the 
complaints under the school’s policy, administrators failed to consider 
both the subjective intent of the speakers and any First Amendment 
protections that might be implicated.170  In fact, the court opined that such 
enforcement was “constitutionally indistinguishable from a full blown 
prosecution.”171 
Ultimately, the court concluded that “it was simply impossible to 
discern any limitation on [the policy’s] scope or any conceptual distinction 
between protected and unprotected conduct.”172  Furthermore, the court 
reiterated the importance of affording speech the broadest First 
Amendment protection possible.173  As such, the district court held that 
 
163. Id. at 861. 
164. Id. at 861–62. 
165. Id. at 862–63 (citations omitted); see supra Section I.A.2. 
166. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864 (citations omitted). 
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173. See id. at 869 (second alteration in original) (“[E]ven if speech ‘exceed[s] all the 
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prevent the discussion.’” (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LIMITATIONS 429 (Da Capo ed. 1972))). 
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the policy implemented by the University of Michigan was an 
unconstitutional restriction of protected speech and, therefore, could not 
be enforced as written, with an exception granted to physical behavior or 
physical conduct.174 
B. Anti-Harassment Policies: Speech Codes Reborn 
The decision in Doe seemed to mark the beginning of the end of 
campus speech codes.175  However, despite courts dismissing several 
speech-restricting policies for being vague and/or overbroad, many public 
colleges and universities have been successful in restricting speech with 
so-called “anti-harassment” policies.176  In reality, “hate speech policies 
not only persist, but they have actually increased in number following a 
series of court decisions that ostensibly found many to be 
unconstitutional.”177 
Some “[f]eminist and anti-racist legal scholars [have] argued that the 
First Amendment should not safeguard language that inflict[s] emotional 
injury through racist or sexist stigmatization.”178  Therefore, one possible 
reason for the prevalence of “anti-harassment” policies is their tendency 
to “punish harassing speech and conduct, as opposed to offensive 
speech.”179  Harassment arises from “[w]ords, conduct, or action . . . that, 
being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes substantial 
emotional distress to that person and serves no legitimate purpose.”180  
Similarly, speech is harassing if it is used “to annoy 
persistently; . . . bother continually; pester; [or] persecute.”181  Applying 
these definitions, harassing speech appears very similar to the “fighting 
words” from Chaplinsky in that harassment would be likely to “inflict 
 
174. Id. at 853. 
175. David L. Hudson, Jr. & Lata Nott, Hate Speech & Campus Speech Codes, FREEDOM 
F. INST., https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-
speech-2/free-speech-on-public-college-campuses-overview/hate-speech-campus-speech-
codes/ [https://perma.cc/RP2S-MQ5X]. 
In 1995, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the University of 
Central Michigan’s speech code in Dambrot v. Central Michigan University.  That 
same year, in Corry v. Stanford, a California state court ruled that Stanford 
University’s speech code violated the First Amendment.  Some First Amendment 
advocates cheered these court decisions as the demise of campus speech codes. 
Id. 
176. See id. 
177. Id. (quoting George Mason law professor Jon Gould). 
178. Shulevitz, supra note 8. 
179. Hudson & Nott, supra note 19. 
180. Harassment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
181. Harass, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004). 
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injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” and therefore 
be punishable as unprotected speech.182 
However, some schools have gone one step further by implementing 
policies that target alleged “bias incidents.”183  According to the 
University of Massachusetts Amherst, bias incidents are 
[a]cts against people or property that do not appear to constitute a 
crime or actionable discrimination, but which may intimidate, mock, 
degrade, or threaten a member or group because of actual or perceived 
age, ancestry or ethnicity, color, creed, disability, gender, gender 
identity or expression, height, immigration or citizenship status, 
marital status, ex-offender status, national origin, veteran status, race, 
religion, religious practice, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, 
weight or any combination of these factors.184 
This language, and its implications, run directly counter to the 
jurisprudence surrounding First Amendment protections. 
This commitment to free expression must be unwavering, because 
there exist many situations where, in the short run, it appears 
advantageous to limit speech to solve pressing social problems, such 
as discriminatory harassment.  If a balancing approach is applied, 
these pressing and tangible short run concerns are likely to outweigh 
the more amorphous and long run benefits of free speech.  However, 
the suppression of speech, even where the speech’s content appears to 
have little value and great costs, amounts to governmental thought 
control.185 
This is not to say that the Court has granted complete deference to the 
First Amendment to the exclusion of current societal needs.  Indeed, the 
Court has provided a solution should the need arise: 
We have previously noted the First Amendment virtues of targeted 
injunctions as alternatives to broad, prophylactic measures.  Such an 
injunction “regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of a 
group,” but only “because of the group’s past actions in the context of 
a specific dispute between real parties.”186 
 
182. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
183. See, e.g., What are Acts of Bias and Hate?, UMASSAMHERST: UMATTER AT UMASS, 
https://www.umass.edu/umatter/bias [https://perma.cc/744W-6PYL]. 
184. Id. (emphasis added). 
185. Hudson & Nott, supra note 19 (quoting UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 F. 
Supp. 1163, 1174 n.9 (E.D. Wis. 1991)). 
186. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2538 (2014) (quoting Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994)). 
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In essence, this would allow someone who has been the subject of 
harassing speech to obtain judicial intervention should college or 
university officials be unwilling, or unable, to act.187 
Understanding the nature of free speech and its importance to 
discourse at public colleges and universities, as well as the remedies 
available to individual parties, is the first step to understanding why safe 
space policies are inherently unconstitutional.  However, it is equally 
important to understand the real-world implications of safe spaces, 
including the arguments offered by those in favor of restricting speech.  
Therefore, those rationales must be tested against the bulwark of 
jurisprudence in favor of the free exchange of ideas that pervades 
institutions of higher learning. 
III. SAFE SPACE POLICIES: UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HARMFUL 
RESTRICTIONS OF SPEECH 
It bears repeating that the safe spaces referred to are not to protect 
students, faculty, and staff from physical injury or harm, but from mental 
or emotional harm.188  Each person naturally has subjective standards of 
what constitutes mental or emotional harm, however, which in turn 
severely frustrates speech regulations that “are permissible so long as they 
are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest and do not 
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression.”189 
A. Safe Spaces Are Unconstitutional Restrictions of Speech 
When asked to justify the implementation of safe space policies, the 
most common answer is to protect students from unpleasant or 
uncomfortable subjects, such as sexual assault.190  Some argue, and rightly 
so, that the right of students to learn about sexual assault does not negate 
other students’ need for safety.191 
No one is trying to suggest that students should be utterly inundated 
with uncomfortable or unpleasant information at all times and in all areas 
of campus.  Nor is anyone trying to minimalize or discount the importance 
of victims of sexual assault or their experiences.  However, administrators 
at public colleges and universities have a duty to keep their students safe, 
 
187. Id. 
188. Holley & Steiner, supra note 13. 
189. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Rock Against Racism v. Ward, 848 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 491 
U.S. 781 (1989)). 
190. Rafidi, supra note 15. 
191. Id. 
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and this means that allowing speakers to present information relating to 
sexual assault awareness and prevention is crucial to that duty.192 
With the truly pervasive nature of sexual assault and sexual violence 
gaining national recognition in recent years, it is impossible to say that 
disseminating information to public college and university students 
regarding sexual assault awareness and prevention lacks “even the 
slightest redeeming social importance.”193  Undeniably, one look at the 
current social climate surrounding the apparent prevalence of sexual 
assault and sexual violence would indicate that educating public college 
and university students clearly qualifies as a “matter[ ] of public 
concern.”194  Therefore, using safe space policies to limit speech, not only 
in the context of sexual assault awareness and prevention, but also other 
matters of equal importance and concern, clearly contradicts the purpose 
of First Amendment speech protections. 
Rafidi also chides a decision by the University of Chicago that 
eliminated safe spaces from its campus.195  He takes issue with the fact 
that removing safe spaces from campuses would leave students with 
nowhere to go during or after attending a particular presentation.196  
However, the rationale behind the University’s decision is simple: if 
students are uncomfortable with a certain topic or presentation, they are 
free to leave.197  In fact, they are free not to attend such presentations in 
the first place. 
If this argument sounds familiar, it is because it was the court’s 
holding in Bonnell when they acknowledged students in a classroom are 
 
192. See Gersen, supra note 17 (“We are currently in the middle of a national effort to 
reform how sexual violence is addressed on college campuses.  This effort is critical, given the 
apparent prevalence of sexual violence among students.”); see also Campus Sexual Violence: 
Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/campus-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/
N7Y5-SRVW]. 
193. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding that speech bearing even 
miniscule social importance deserves First Amendment protection). 
194. Id. at 488 (explaining that matters of public concern may be discussed freely and 
publicly); see also Gersen, supra note 17. 
195. Rafidi, supra note 15.  It is important to note that the University of Chicago is a 
private institution, and as such, it is significantly less beholden to many aspects of the 
Constitution, including the First Amendment.  Therefore, the decision to forego speech 
regulations in acknowledgement of the greater need for open discourse among students at 
colleges and universities should serve as a shining example to those public colleges and 
universities that would consider regulating speech on their campuses. 
196. See id. 
197. Id.  But see Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 819 (6th Cir. 2001) (commenting that 
students in a classroom setting are a “captive audience” and susceptible to intimidation 
leveraged against them by the person in charge of grading them). 
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a “captive audience.”198  However, unlike Bonnell, students at the 
University of Chicago would only be subjected to uncomfortable or 
unpleasant content if they chose to attend a presentation.199 
Rafidi also suggests that while “[s]afe spaces are useful . . . not all 
students are entitled to have safe spaces.”200  This is a troubling 
proposition because it could allow campus administrators to handpick 
which students are “entitled” to safe spaces and therefore what speech 
should be allowed or restricted, something that cannot be reconciled with 
the First Amendment.201  This would be a direct contradiction to First 
Amendment jurisprudence in general, and specifically the narrow 
tailoring/unreasonable limitation test established in Ward.202  The 
implementation of such a proposition would also contradict the Court’s 
holding that “the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at 
least without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and 
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not 
constitutionally permissible.”203 
Rafdi’s proposition also suggests that only certain students and 
organizations should be allowed access to safe spaces; the corollary, of 
course, is that other students and organizations should be prohibited from 
accessing safe spaces.204  Under Rafidi’s proposition, authorities would 
not only have the ability to arbitrarily decide what students and 
organizations should be permitted to have safe spaces; they would also be 
permitted, if not encouraged, to police students’ backgrounds in an effort 
to ferret out those who would seek to abuse “safe spaces.”205  Similarly, 
allowing administrators to determine which students and organizations are 
entitled to safe spaces would be the functional equivalent of allowing them 
to handpick what speech to permit and what to restrict, which is akin to 
“governmental thought control.”206 
Mirroring Rafidi’s position, RaeAnn Pickett wrote a similar article 
praising safe spaces as necessary.  Pickett chided the University of 
 
198. Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 819. 
199. Rafidi, supra note 15. 
200. Id. 
201. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (“Freedom 
of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a 
benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.”). 
202. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789 (1989). 
203. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added). 
204. See Rafidi, supra note 15. 
205. Id. (“Students may be taking advantage of safe spaces . . . .”). 
206. See Hudson & Nott, supra note 19 (quoting UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, 774 
F. Supp. 1163, 1174 n.9 (E.D. Wis. 1991)). 
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Chicago for ending its policies regarding “trigger warnings” and safe 
spaces.207  While Pickett concedes that the policies were ended to further 
promote academic freedom, she also improperly places the focus of her 
argument on the subjective feelings of the students.208  To the contrary, 
the Court has repeatedly held that speech cannot be restricted by the 
government solely because it is unpleasant, uncomfortable, or even 
blatantly offensive to those who hear it.209  Perhaps the Court said it best: 
“‘The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth “out of a 
multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.”’”210 
One such example of “authoritative selection” was discussed in an 
article by Flemming Rose: 
[I]n the aftermath of a recent visit by leading feminist intellectual and 
cultural critic Laura Kipnis, [six professors at Wellesley College] 
proposed setting up a censorship committee to vet speakers in order to 
make sure that ‘disempowered groups’ would be protected from ideas 
and speech they find offensive and harmful.211 
 
207. Pickett, supra note 16. 
208. See id.  (“[Ending] the [university’s] polic[ies] puts many students in the 
uncomfortable position of entering spaces that may or may not be safe for them to learn, interact, 
and share in—and puts the onus on them to leave or to endure the situation.”). 
209. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (emphasis added) (“[D]ebate on 
public issues . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks 
on government and public officials.”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) 
(emphasis added) (“All ideas . . . —unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to 
the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of [the First Amendment].”); see 
also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187 (1972) (“As repugnant as these views may have been, 
especially to one with [the President’s] responsibility, the mere expression of them would not 
justify the denial of First Amendment rights.”). 
210. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (alteration 
in original) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
211. Rose, supra note 1.  Wellesley College, like the University of Chicago, is a private 
institution not subject to the same standard under First Amendment jurisprudence.  Philip J. 
Faccenda and Kathleen Ross, Constitutional and Statutory Regulation of Private Colleges and 
Universities, 9 VAL. U. L. REV. 539, 540–41 (1975). 
An individual alleging that a private educational institution has deprived him of 
his constitutional rights must show that the institution acted on behalf of the state—
as an arm of the state, which if proven, subjects the private school to the 
jurisdiction of federal court. . . .  If state action is not shown, a private school can 
be sued only as an individual citizen and the reservoir of constitutional protections 
and procedural tools available when the private school is sued as an agent of the 
state are not available to the plaintiff. 
Id. 
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Establishing censorship committees at public colleges and 
universities would certainly qualify as governmental speech regulation.212  
For example, such a committee could be tasked with predicting whether a 
particular speaker or event would cause subjective feelings of discomfort 
or uneasiness among certain students.213  This raises the question, though, 
of how this committee would gauge what level of discomfort or 
uneasiness would merit the censorship, or outright prohibition, of a 
speaker or event?  In all likelihood, they would err on the side of caution 
and simply disallow anything that they thought might make the student 
body uncomfortable to any degree, reminiscent of the “undifferentiated 
fear” standard that the Court denounced in Tinker.214 
Now, proponents of censorship committees would argue that bringing 
“‘guest speakers with controversial and objectionable beliefs’ to campus 
‘impose[s] on the liberty of students, staff and faculty.’”215  However, the 
Court has held that “state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism . . . [and] students may not be regarded as closed-circuit 
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate.”216  
Furthermore, 
[a]lthough such measures have been deliberately approved by men of 
great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and 
State were wholly different from those upon which our institutions 
rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose 
such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to 
both letter and spirit of the Constitution.217 
Indeed, this bizarre dissonance between language that can be 
regulated in an academic setting and language that students feel should be 
regulated is underscored by an “incident” that occurred at a Smith College 
alumnae event in the fall of 2014.218  This incident involved an 
“[argument] against the use of the euphemism ‘the n-word’ when teaching 
 
212. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 186.  “‘[G]uilt by association alone, without [establishing] 
that an individual’s association poses the threat feared by the Government,’ is an impermissible 
basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights.”  Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967)). 
213. Id. 
214. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 
603 (1967)). 
215. Rose, supra note 1. 
216. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
217. Id. at 511–12 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)). 
218. Shulevitz, supra note 8.  Smith College is a private institution, shielded from the First 
Amendment in the same way as the University of Chicago and Wellesley.  See Faccenda & 
Ross, supra note 211.  This incident illustrates the inherent problem with restricting speech 
based on subjective standards, such as how students may “feel” about the speech in question. 
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American history or ‘The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.’”219  To be 
clear, it appears that the euphemism, “the n-word,” is what was actually 
used in lieu of any derogatory slang; moreover, the euphemism did not 
appear directed at anyone.220  In relation to this incident, Kaminer made 
the following remark: “It’s amazing to me that [students] can’t distinguish 
between racist speech and speech about racist speech, [and] between 
racism and discussions [about] racism.”221  This statement perfectly 
encapsulates the inherent danger, repeatedly noted by the Court, that arises 
when speech is regulated based on subjective feelings of discomfort, 
unpleasantness, or inappropriateness.222 
In a similar incident, Zineb El Rhazoui, a Charlie Hebdo journalist, 
was chided by the University of Chicago student newspaper for allegedly 
using her “relative position of power . . . [as a] free pass to make 
condescending attacks on a member of the university.”223  Evidently, one 
of the students who disagreed with Charlie Hebdo’s “apparent disrespect 
for Muslims” was even less pleased when Ms. El Rhazoui stated, “‘Being 
Charlie Hebdo means to die because of a drawing,’ and not everyone has 
the guts to do that.”224  This interaction, and the subsequent backlash, 
illustrates yet another problem with restricting speech based on subjective 
feelings of comfort: “[T]he student[s] and [their] defender[s] had 
burrowed so deep inside their cocoons, [and] were so overcome by their 
own fragility, that they couldn’t see that it was Ms. El Rhazoui who was 
in need of a safer space.”225 
Furthermore, a Pierce College student was subjected to an arguably 
unconstitutional restriction of his free speech rights in fall of the 2016 
school year.226  This student, Kevin Shaw, was stopped from distributing 
copies of the U.S. Constitution on the grounds of Pierce College for 
 
219. Id. 
220. Id.; see Challenging the Ideological Echo Chamber: Free Speech, Civil Discourse, 
and Liberal Arts, SOUNDCLOUD (Sept. 22, 2014, 25:30), https://soundcloud.com/sydney-
sadur/challenging-the-ideological-echo-chamber-free-speech-civil-discourse-and-the-liberal-
arts. 
221. Id. (emphasis added). 
222. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (emphasis added) (“All ideas having 
even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even 
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the [First 
Amendment].”). 
223. Shulevitz, supra note 8 (“[Zineb] El Rhazoui is an immigrant, a woman, Arab, a 
human-rights activist who has known exile, and a journalist living in very real fear of death.”). 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. See generally Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and Damages, Shaw 
v. Burke et al., No. CV-17-2386 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2017), 2017 WL 1173731 [hereinafter 
Complaint] (challenging the constitutionality of the “free speech area” policy at Pierce College). 
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allegedly violating the campus speech policy.227  This policy “restricts the 
distribution of literature, including ‘petitions, circulars, leaflets, 
newspapers, miscellaneous printed matter and other materials,’ to ‘the 
geographical limits of the Free Speech Area’ on each campus.”228  In fact, 
the policy goes so far as to state: 
Individuals planning to distribute material on campus are required to 
go to the Vice President of Student Services Office located on the third 
floor of the Student Services Building between the hours of 9:00am 
and 4:00pm to: 1. Report his/her presence on campus; 2. Identify the 
organization and give the name(s) of the distributor(s) and address of 
the organization; [and] 3. Indicate how many people will be 
distributing along with the date(s) and time(s) of distribution.229 
This policy is similar to the censorship committee suggested by 
Wellesley College, except for a crucial difference: Pierce College is a 
public college campus.230  Moreover, “‘handing out leaflets in the 
advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint . . . is the essence of 
First Amendment expression’; ‘[n]o form of speech is entitled to greater 
constitutional protection.’”231  By implementing this policy, the Los 
Angeles Community College District (of which Pierce College is a 
member) is able to quite literally police who is speaking on their campus 
as well as what they are speaking about.232  Simply put, enforcing this 
policy is fundamentally antithetical to both the spirit and letter of the First 
Amendment.233 
Additionally, using this speech policy to restrict free speech in such 
a way—particularly by defining a particular area in which free speech may 
be practiced—effectively makes the rest of the campus a de facto safe 
 
227. Id. at ¶ 8 (emphasis added). 
228. Id. at ¶ 9 (citations omitted). 
229. Id. at ¶ 11. 
230. See Rose, supra note 1. 
231. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2536 (2014) (emphasis added) (quoting 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)). 
232. See Complaint, supra note 226, at ¶ 11 (outlining the steps required to obtain a permit 
to use the designated free speech area, including disclosure of the content of the speech engaged 
in by those applying to use the space). 
233. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (“[D]ebate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969) (“[I]t is this sort of hazardous freedom [of 
speech] . . . that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of [all] 
Americans . . . .”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“All ideas having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the full protection of the [First 
Amendment] . . . .”). 
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space.234  Therefore, this policy is arguably beyond the scope intended by 
the court’s holding in Bonnell, with regard to the principle of captive 
audience versus the ability to leave or avoid at will.235  In fact, such 
restriction on the ability to exercise free speech sounds much more akin 
to the Court’s concern in Tinker that “[f]reedom of expression would not 
truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent 
government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.”236 
Whether it is a presentation on sexual assault awareness and 
prevention,237 an academic discussion about the merits of white-washing 
historical pedagogy with euphemisms,238 a presentation by a journalist 
whose life and freedom of speech is under constant threat,239 or a student 
attempting to distribute copies of the Constitution at Pierce College,240 one 
thing is clear: these are not instances of targeted, repetitive, verbal 
harassment—the latter form of speech is impermissible under First 
Amendment jurisprudence.241  However, the above-mentioned instances 
are examples of academic and scholarly discussion, the likes of which 
have been deemed constitutionally protected exercises of free speech by 
the Court numerous times.242 
B. Safe Spaces Harm Students by Limiting Exposure to Concepts and 
Ideas That Force Students to Think Critically 
Rape law is one subject of the safe space debate that should be of 
particular concern to law students, lawyers, judges, and everyone involved 
in the legal community.243  In recent years, students have started being 
advised that they “should not feel pressured to attend or participate in class 
sessions that focus on the law of sexual violence.”244  In fact, “[i]ndividual 
 
234. See Safe Space, supra note 12.  Safe spaces are “intended to be free of bias, conflict, 
criticism, or potentially threatening actions, ideas, or conversations.”  Id.  Therefore, it would 
make sense that restricting any such conflicts or conversations to a very small, designated area, 
effectively frees the rest of the campus from such issues and thereby transforms the campus into 
a massive safe space. 
235. See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 819 (6th Cir. 2001); Rafidi, supra note 15. 
236. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
237. See, e.g., Rafidi, supra note 15. 
238. See, e.g., Shulevitz, supra note 8 (discussing the use of the euphemism “the n-word” 
when teaching American History or the Adventures of Huckleberry Finn). 
239. Id. (discussing the struggle of Ms. El Rhazoui). 
240. Complaint, supra note 226, at ¶ 13. 
241. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942); supra Section II.B. 
242. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511–12 (1969) 
(“[S]tudents may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State 
chooses to communicate.”). 
243. See Gersen, supra note 17. 
244. Id. 
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students often ask teachers not to include the law of rape on exams for fear 
that the material would cause them to preform less well.”245  More 
troubling still is the notion that teachers should stop teaching rape law 
altogether.246 
There can be little doubt that sexual assault and violence are very 
serious issues that colleges and universities are striving to address—with 
many campuses bringing victim-survivors to speak to students about their 
experiences and even offer advice.247  Therefore, to suggest that rape law 
should not be taught is perplexing, especially when one considers the sad 
state of rape law even thirty years ago. 
Until the mid-nineteen-eighties, rape law was not taught in law 
schools, because it wasn’t considered important or suited to the 
rational pedagogy of law-school classrooms.  The victims of rape, 
most often women, were seen as emotionally involved witnesses, 
making it difficult to ascertain what really happened in a private 
encounter.  This skepticism toward the victim was reflected in the 
traditional law of rape, which required a woman to “resist to the 
utmost” the physical force used to make her have intercourse.  Trials 
often included inquiries into a woman’s sexual history, because of the 
notion that a woman who wasn’t [a virgin] must have been complicit 
in any sex [act] that occurred.  Hard-fought feminist reforms attacked 
the sexism in rape law, and eventually the topic became a major part 
of most law schools’ mandatory criminal-law course.248 
It cannot be denied that the topic of rape, and subsequently rape law, 
is an intensely uncomfortable subject for most people, particularly those 
who have been the victim of sexual violence, sexual assault, and rape.249  
This is especially true when professors teach cases “that test the limits of 
the rules, and that fall near the rapidly shifting line separating criminal 
conduct from legal sex.”250  However, for law students, these cases are 
 
245. Id. 
246. Id. (“[S]ome students have even suggested that rape law should not be taught because 
of its potential to cause distress.”). 
247. See, e.g., Shulevitz, supra note 8. 
248. Gersen, supra note 17. 
249. Id.; see also Skylar Washington, Let’s Get Comfortable with Being Uncomfortable: 
A Discussion About Rape and Sexual Assault, MEDIUM (Mar. 27, 2018), https://medium.com/
gendered-violence/lets-get-comfortable-with-being-uncomfortable-a-discussion-about-rape-
and-sexual-assault-937f8fc15dac [https://perma.cc/DNK3-QMS3] (“Whether it’s someone who 
has been violated or someone who hasn’t, the word ‘rape’ sets an unpleasant, very devastating 
tone that creates a blanket of silence.”). 
250. See Gersen, supra note 17. 
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arguably more instructive precisely because they help teach not only the 
rules but how to apply academic concepts to real-world problems.251 
While it may be incredibly uncomfortable to learn about and discuss 
the law governing sexual assault, sexual violence, and rape, the fact 
remains that knowing how to apply the law to real-world facts to achieve 
justice for victims is inarguably a “matter[ ] of public concern,” similar to 
the concerns voiced in Roth.252  Furthermore, unlike the speech at issue in 
Bonnell, discussion of sexual assault, sexual violence, and rape in a class 
where the anticipated educational outcome is a fundamental 
understanding of the law governing these issues inarguably meets the 
“public concern” standard raised in Bonnell.253 
This relates back to the concern that Rafidi expressed about the 
possible traumatization of students who are exposed to sexual assault 
survivors who come to campuses for the purpose of educating both men 
and women about the dangers of sexual violence.254  In fact, there are those 
who would seek to keep sexual assault awareness and prevention speakers 
from coming to campuses altogether, because “[b]ringing in a speaker like 
that could serve to invalidate people’s experiences.”255  However, “[n]ow 
more than ever, it is critical that law students develop the ability to engage 
productively and analytically in conversations about sexual assault.”256  In 
fact, “[i]f the topic of sexual assault were to leave the law-school 
classroom, it would be a tremendous loss—above all to victims of sexual 
assault.”257  This further serves to underscore the fact that such discussions 
are crucial matters of public concern.258 
In a similar article, Flemming Rose challenges the idea that students 
should be free of conflict and negativity on college and university 
 
251. Id.  See generally Jonathan Zimmerman & Emily Robertson, The Case for 
Contentious Curricula, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2017/04/the-case-for-contentious-classrooms/524268/ [https://perma.cc/8X3S-7DK6] 
(arguing that schools should engage students in contentious subjects so they can “engage in 
reasoned, informed debates across society’s myriad differences”). 
252. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940)). 
253. Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 812 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Speech which can be ‘fairly 
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community’ 
touches upon matters of public concern.” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 
(1983))). 
254. See Rafidi, supra note 15; see also supra Section III.A. 
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258. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957); Bonnell, 241 F.3d. at 812. 
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campuses.259  He recounts an interview with activist and former advisor to 
President Obama, Van Jones (a.k.a. Anthony Kapel Jones), who made a 
powerful statement about the kind of comfort and safety safe spaces seek 
to promote.  Jones stated: 
I think [safe spaces are] a terrible idea for the following reason: I don’t 
want you to be safe ideologically.  I don’t want you to be safe 
emotionally.  I want you to be strong.  That’s different.  I’m not going 
to pave the jungle for you.  Put on some boots, and learn how to deal 
with adversity.  I’m not going to take the weights out of the gym.  
That’s the whole point of the gym. 
You can’t live on a campus where people say stuff you don’t like? […] 
You are creating a kind [o]f liberalism that the minute it crosses the 
street into the real world is not just useless but obnoxious and 
dangerous.  I want you to be offended every single day on this campus.  
I want you to be deeply aggrieved and offended and upset and then 
learn how to speak back.260 
This explains the danger of shielding students from uncomfortable 
topics and discussions as well as the reasoning behind why they should 
feel uncomfortable in the first place.  It also serves as a perfect modern 
encapsulation of the Court’s view that “unorthodox ideas, controversial 
ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion” are worthy 
of the protections of the First Amendment.261 
Rose also mentions a speech made by then-President Barack Obama 
at a high school in Des Moines, Iowa (home of the famous Tinker 
decision), where the president spoke about the importance of experiencing 
different perspectives, ideals, and beliefs.262  “[T]he purpose of college is 
not just . . . to transmit skills.  It’s also . . . to make you a better citizen; to 
help you to evaluate information; [and] to help you make your way 
through the world.”263  This would be difficult, if not impossible, for 
someone who had nothing but their own thoughts, beliefs, and 
perspectives on life, society, and everything else.264  Removing challenge 
 
259. Rose, supra note 1. 
260. Id. (second alteration in original). 
261. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. 
262. Rose, supra note 1. 
263. Id. (quoting President Barak Obama). 
264. Id. (emphasis added) (“[I]t was because there was this space where you could interact 
with people who didn’t agree with you and had different backgrounds that I then started testing 
my own assumptions.  And sometimes I changed my mind.”); see also Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969) (“But our Constitution says we must take 
this risk . . . that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of 
Americans . . . .”). 
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and discomfort from the learning environment can be problematic, even 
detrimental, to students. 
It’s one thing to say that students should not be laughed at for posing 
a question or for offering a wrong answer.  It’s another to say that 
students must never be conscious of their ignorance.  It’s one thing to 
say that students should not be belittled for a personal preference or 
harassed because of an unpopular opinion.  It’s another to say that 
students must never be asked why their preference and opinions are 
different from those of others.  It’s one thing to say that students should 
be capable of self-revelation.  It’s another to say that they must always 
like what they see revealed.265 
Indeed, it cannot be denied that “[t]he path to self-discovery can be 
difficult and stressful.”266  The very real concern raised by many 
opponents of safe spaces is that “safe classrooms might result in a 
nonacademic environment that stifles student learning.”267  Similarly, a 
question is raised when one considers the potential for “one student’s 
speaking up in a safe space . . . to seriously harm another student.”268  
Moreover, “[a] comment that is perceived as an appropriate critique by 
one student might be felt as judgmental or as an attack by another.”269  
These subjective feelings, while not invalidated, fail to withstand the 
Court’s many denouncements.270 
Therefore, students venturing into the academic arena should accept, 
first and foremost, that “learning necessarily involves not merely risk, but 
the pain of giving up a former condition in favor of a new way of seeing 
 
265. Holley & Steiner, supra note 13, at 51 (quoting Robert Boostrom, “Unsafe Spaces”: 
Reflections on a Specimen of Educational Jargon, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
American Educational Research Association (Mar. 24, 1997), made available at 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED407686.pdf [https://perma.cc/CV8J-J2WD]). 
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268. Id. at 52.  “[O]ne must question whether students feel safe only in an environment 
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269. Id. at 61. 
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expression.”); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 869 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (discussing the 
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173, at 429)). 
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things.”271  Indeed, “[i]t might also be important to discuss the connection 
between personal and intellectual growth and periodic discomfort or 
challenge.”272  President Obama summarized this line of thinking thus: 
[W]hen I went to college, suddenly there were some folks who didn’t 
think at all like me.  And if I had an opinion about something, they’d 
look at me and say, well that’s stupid.  And then they’d describe how 
they saw the world.  And they might have had a different sense of 
politics, or they might have a different view about poverty, or they 
might have a different perspective on race, and sometimes their views 
would be infuriating to me. . . . Sometimes I realized, you know what, 
maybe I’ve been too narrow-minded.  Maybe I didn’t take this into 
account.  Maybe I should see this person’s perspective.273 
Students are supposed to go to a college or university to broaden not 
only their academic education, but their social education as well.274  Many 
students who go away to college are leaving their homes, sometimes their 
states, and in some cases even their countries, for the first time.  The very 
act of being on a college campus and attending classes exposes each 
student to variety of backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives.275  It is 
important to foster acceptance and understanding, not by shutting down 
or silencing discourse because it may be uncomfortable, but by 
encouraging people to share their experiences without fear of reprisal from 
fellow students, faculty, or staff, merely because they speak about a  topic 
that caused them to think critically about something.276 
CONCLUSION 
Federal courts have ruled time and again that speech cannot be 
restricted, prohibited, or punished based solely on its content.277  To do so 
would start the country down a slippery slope towards tyranny, the very 
likes of which the Constitution was designed to prevent.278  Indeed, the 
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courts have also acknowledged that the freedom to speak and discuss 
openly all things important to the current times is most crucial in the arena 
of education.279  After all, an informed citizenry cannot be adequately 
informed if discussion and debate is restricted. 
And yet, that is what safe spaces seek to do.  They seek to allow only 
speech deemed “acceptable”—that is, speech that does not upset the 
delicate sensibilities of the arbitrary few who control, among other things, 
campus advertisements and guest speakers.280  To allow this manner of 
speech regulation would be to permit—even support—some viewpoints 
more strongly than others, to say the college fully supports and accepts X 
platform, viewpoint, or opinion, but denounces Y platform, viewpoint, or 
opinion.  This is the very evil the First Amendment was designed to 
prohibit. 
Furthermore, to conduct such blatantly arbitrary control over free 
speech on campuses would be not only detrimental, but antithetical to the 
very reason students go to colleges and universities in the first place.  One 
could hardly agree that students could successfully broaden their minds if 
their minds are only exposed to that which the administration approves by 
way of “authoritative selection.”281  The mere act of attending college will 
expose students to uncomfortable—even offensive—thoughts, beliefs, 
perspectives, and opinions.  And that is a good thing, because being 
exposed to something different, something they do not agree with, forces 
students to move past “I disagree” and explain why.  If they cannot explain 
why they disagree with someone, students cannot convince others that 
their thoughts, beliefs, perspectives, or opinions are incorrect.  In the 
words of Justice Black: “I do not believe that it can be too often repeated 
that the freedom[ ] of speech . . . guaranteed by the First Amendment must 
be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to 
the ideas we cherish.”282 
 
279. See supra Section I.B. 
280. See Complaint, supra note 226, at ¶ 11. 
281. Id. 
282. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
